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Article
Stumbling Towards Distributive Justice
Aileen E. Nowlan
A bstract

The rapidly approaching end of the Kyoto Protocol and the vitriolic
protests surrounding trade negotiations warm the heart of
international law pessimists. Although shared systems for prosperity
demand global solutions to shared risks, international law is derided
for an inability to distribute the resources necessary to create global
prosperity and manage global risks. This Article will demonstrate
that such criticisms are misplaced. The protests, the stalled
negotiations, and the solutions all emerge from a rich tradition of
distribution of resources in international law²one that is poorly
understood, unfairly ignored, and replete with useful principles,
frameworks, and successes.
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Stumbling Towards Distributive Justice
Aileen E. Nowlan
Introduction
When Japan released nuclear wastewater into the Pacific, other
nations stepped in to help stem the flow from the crippled reactors.1 When
the G20 addressed how to measure risk in the global financial system, it
recommended technical assistance to countries with fragile financial
monitoring.2 States have been offering and demanding resources from each
other since time immemorial, either as punishment for the unsuccessful use
of force or as reward for successful conquest. As cooperation replaces
outright coercion as an enforcer of globalization, collaboration spreads
risks as fast as it shares prosperity. The international community is
struggling to invest in global public goods, reduce shared threats, preserve
critical assets, and respond to moral obligations to moderate the harshest
inequities. At least some trans-border threats gain strength from systems of
interconnection, such as air travel and global financial markets, that have
created unprecedented wealth and a shared sense of community. Nations
must meet these threats through collective action because they are
unwilling to accept the alternative of stemming the flow of capital, goods,
and people. Unfortunately, efforts to share risk and responsibility across
borders have recently seemed to run aground.
Work on distributional decision-making in international law tends
to address the distribution of resources between only a few countries, such
as those that share cross-border hydrocarbon or water resources.3 Tentative
models of international law condition distribution on social relationships
among nations and legitimacy gained as part of a norm community, 4 on the
See Chizu Nomiyama & Shinichi Saoshiro, Japan seeks Russian help to end nuclear crisis, REUTERS
(Apr. 5, 2011, 03:44), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/idINIndia-56111120110404; Eric
Talmadge & Mari Yamaguchi, U S rushes freshwater to help Japan nuclear plant , SEATTLE TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2011, 03:42), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/
2014593408_apasjapanearthquake.html.
2
See G20 WORKING GROUP ON ENHANCING SOUND REGULATION AND STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY, FINAL REPORT 45 (2009) available at
rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/20_010409.pdf.
3
See Eve Vogel, Regionalization and Democratization Through International Law: Intertwined
Jurisdictions, Scales and Politics in The Columbia River Treaty, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 337 (2007).
4
See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dyna mics and Political Change , 52
INT¶L ORG. 887 (1998); Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in
Latin America , 47 INT¶L ORG. 411 (1993) (discussing norm communities and decreased salience of
sovereignty).
1
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opportunity to enshrine existing balances of power,5 or even on the need for
cooperation.6 Writing in 1995, Thomas Franck commented on the
motivation behind a newfound maturity of international law:
Another reason for the exponential growth in international
law in recent years is a prismatic change in the way in
which humanity perceives itself. The challenge of space
exploration has joined with the depletion and degradation
of WKH ZRUOG¶V HQYLURQPHQW    WR HQWLFH RU FRPSHO
individuals and governments to think in terms of our
common destiny: to counter humanity as a single gifted but
greedy species, sharing a common, finite, and endangered
speck of the universe.7
This Article will demonstrate how, despite pessimism or silence
from international law scholars, international law is already distributing
resources among nations on a number of fronts. This distributive capacity
of international law is so successful and is used for such essential functions
that it has gone unnoticed. Moving away from the question of whether
international law LV³ODZ´LQIDYRURIWKHTXHVWLRQ of what international law
should do indicates the maturity of international law.8 The frameworks for
distribution of resources have responded to each other over time,
incorporating features that had staying power and rejecting others. Despite
the effective success of distribution in international law and the rich
intellectual history of the evolution of the associated frameworks, very little
is understood about why or how international law achieves distribution of
resources.
Within a country, reducing a collective risk, sharing national
patrimony, or investing in public goods is by no means easy. However, the
attempt at least benefits from a framework of debate²including notions of
the minimum dignified existence of a citizen, the relative role of
government and the private sector, cumulative responsibility for advantages
or disadvantages passed on through generations²and from a community of
accountability to carry out the resulting program. The outcome from these
debates within a country is greater or lesser distribution of resources in the
form of money, opportunity, or knowledge.
See INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 59 (Tim Dunne et al., eds., 2d
ed. 2010).
6
See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN
TRANSITION    QRWLQJWKDW³FRRSHUDWLRQDORQHKROGVWKHDQVZHUWRZRUOGSUREOHPV´ 
7
THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (1995).
8
Id. at 9.
5
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It is even harder to imagine distribution of resources among
nations; distribution of resources is not considered to be a strength of
international law. At the heart of the hardest fights about the global
response to shared risk and reward is the question of distribution. For
example, who must pay for the relocation of citizens of drowning island
nations? When distribution must happen across borders, the international
community lacks even the framework of debate. Categories can get
hopelessly muddled. Even responsibility for the next generation is hard to
understand when the next generation of Americans may have been born in
the developing countries that trans-border distribution seeks to assist. Eric
Posner warns that:
[W]e should not be surprised by the weakness and
imperfection of treaties²such as the Kyoto Protocol²or
the weaker version of Kyoto to which the United States
would agree. Treaties, unlike domestic law, must not only
be welfare-maximizing; they must also be Pareto superior.
The more states that are involved, and the more
heterogeneous their positions, the weaker the treaties will
be . . . . We should rarely observe treaties that redistribute
wealth from one state to another.9
Roberto Unger explains that the need to separate the market rules and
arrangements guiding individual initiative from those governing
LQHTXDOLWLHVKDVEURXJKWWKHODZ³up against a limit, of efficacy as well as of
LQVLJKW WKDW LW KDV \HW WR RYHUFRPH´10 Another skeptic writes that
³>D@OORFDWLRQLVD*RUGLDQNQRW2QHFDQGHYLVHFOHYHU ways to untie parts
RIWKHSUREOHPEXWRQO\E\HQWDQJOLQJRWKHUV´11
Line drawing exercises that are by no means simple in a domestic
context become intractable when the lines govern the relationship between
nations. How would one divide the haves from the have-nots, when both
groups exchange members so rapidly? Even before populating such
categories, critics counter that international law lacks a coherent theory of
justice with which to direct the flow of resources. Common international
law mechanisms are based on simpler exertions, such as prohibiting
Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 528-529 (2006).
Posner also argues that states are under no legal obligation to cooperate, although they might want to, in
order to create global public goods. Id. at 522.
10
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND
THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS 93 (2007).
11
DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL
WARMING 53 (2001).
9
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dangerous acts,12 regulating risky activities,13 or compensating for past
wrongs.14 Other political, practical, and cognitive challenges are certainly
stumbling blocks to distribution.15 However, this Article will argue that the
prevailing skepticism about the ability of international law to distribute
hundreds of billions of dollars in costs and benefits among states is an
unfounded impediment to the design of distributional systems on the scale
needed to address global threats.
Part I of this Article outlines the complex web of global risks and
opportunities, which are multiplied by the substantive needs and demands
for participation of myriad parties. It describes the stunted distributive
efforts thus far achieved through international law, and explains how the
lack of understanding of how international law achieves distribution of
resources is the primary impediment to deeper collective action. Part II
surveys a surprisingly rich field of distributive achievements in
international law. It analyzes how these frameworks draw on distinct kinds
of justifications: compensation for past wrongs, necessity, investment in
global public goods, and the common heritage of mankind. It also
uncovers how distributive frameworks based on compensation and
necessity are uncontested in principle, but difficult to implement.
Frameworks designed for investment in global public goods are effective
over the long term if distribution is simple and direct, but complexities in
the formula²such as taxonomies of countries, or unclear domestic
bargaining positions²can overwhelm the investment rationale.
Suggestions of distribution to reflect the common heritage of mankind
prompt vociferous resistance from developed countries, which may
nevertheless treat resources as if they are in trust.
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
13
See Convention on the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter,
Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
14
See infra, text accompanying notes 87-94 on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
15
In the climate change context, see, for example, Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International
$JUHHPHQWV,QWHUQDO+HWHURJHQHLW\DQG&OLPDWH&KDQJH7KH³7ZR&KLQDV´ Problem, 50 VA. J. INT'L
L. 325, 329-30 (2010  GLVFXVVLQJ&KLQD¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRVLJQRQWRDJOREDOFOLPDWHFKDQJHDJUHHPHQW
due to internal social and political dynamics²greater emissions are to be expected from Western
China, which is much less developed than Eastern China and is a source of social unrest because of
this); Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone Or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism And National Cli mate
Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 247-49 (2010) (arguing that incremental national
legislation may hinder rather than help development of a global climate change framework); Jedediah
Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Cli mate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy , 119 YALE L.J.
1122, 1135 (2010) (discussing difficulties in understanding risks, especially concerning a catastrophic
SURFHVVWKDWLV³GLIIXVHKDUGWRHQYLVLRQDQGGHOD\HGLQWLPH´ 
12
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Part III elicits lessons from the survey of distributive frameworks
to articulate patterns of distribution in international law. Part III
hypothesizes that compensation for wrongs and moral obligations both
successfully motivate distribution in international law. So too does an
investment orientation, as long as the goal is clear and simply managed.
The Conclusion confirms that designers of distributive frameworks
incorporate prior reactions, both for and against, into subsequent iterations.
States also react to distributive frameworks not only for what they mean for
the goal at hand, but for the precedent they set on distribution in
international law in general. Given common goals, common opportunities,
moral outrage, or individual responsibility, international law demonstrates
a resilient ability to distribute resources across borders.
I.

A Sieve and a Shield: T he Problem of Resources and Borders

The movement of resources across borders is not a new
phenomenon. The permeability of borders, and the nature of the risks and
EHQHILWVWKDWSDVVWKURXJKWKHPFUHDWHSUDFWLFDOFKDOOHQJHVWRDVRYHUHLJQ¶V
struggle for the well-being of its citizens and an urgent need for a method
of distribution by which international law may respond to trans-border
challenges. This Part will explain how the current impetus for the
distribution of resources arises from a more complex web of threats and
participants than any historical framework has been called on to address.
Lacking a practical framework for implementation, scale, or a legitimating
theory, international law has not yet adapted to meet the distribution
challenge imposed by globalized threats. This Part ends by describing how
the lack of a legitimating theory of distribution is the cause of the
intransigence in responding to globalized threats.

A.

Complex Web of Parties and Threats

The challenge of distribution of resources across borders draws its
urgency from increased threats to well-being and livelihood: disease, armed
conflict, resource depletion, and environmental destruction that all cross
borders with impunity. The complexity of addressing global threats is
multiplied by the increased political influence of nations emerging from
under the foreign policy black-out curtain of colonial powers. The
complexity of demands for participation from developing nations and the
urgency of global threats match the growth enjoyed from globalization like
the teeth of a zipper.
Almost every sphere of human existence is threatened by a force
that crosses borders. Diseases once found in the jungles of Central Africa
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arrive in the United States.16 Zebra mussels arrive in ship ballasts and
decimate native species in the Great Lakes.17 Amazonian farmers burn the
last repositories of rare plants and animals in order to graze cattle.18 The
FROODSVH RI ,FHODQG¶V EDQNV SURPSWV WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP WR use antiterrorism laws to seize their assets,19 perhaps fearing a national security
crisis arising from social unrest due to lost savings. The threats from
climate change alone include rising sea levels, intensifying weather events,
declining forests and increasing desertification, loss of ecosystems and
wildlife, drought and famine, poor health, and climate change refugees.20
The perfection of one form of exploitation²such as hydraulic fracturing of
natural gas²may hasten the end of such practices and the livelihoods that
depend on them.21
In the face of trans-border collective action problems, more nations
are demanGLQJDVD\LQWKHLUUHVROXWLRQ³7KHQHHGIRUEURDGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´
raised by developing nations changes both the content of the distributive
frameworks and the process of agreeing to them.22 When greater weight is
given to the substantive needs of developing countries, the contents of
proposed systems are measured against the redress they provide for
historical claims for equity and justice. The nature of these demands is
incredibly diverse, because developing nations are divided across a
dizzying variety of spectra: ³poor and rich states, poor and rich persons,
parsimonious and spendthrift consumers,´ and concern for present and
future generations.23
Demands for participation can be equally pressing. When climate
change negotiators in Copenhagen broke into a smaller group of twenty-

Michael Specter, The Doomsday Strain, NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/
UHSRUWLQJIDBIDFWBVSHFWHU ³WKHKHDOWKULVNVFDXVHGE\KXQWLQJ>PRQNH\VRUDSes] are
enormous²not just for the Africans who kill and eat them but for billions of others throughout the
world. If not for the consumption of bushmeat, AIDS would never have spread so insidiously across the
planet. That pandemic, the most lethal of moderQWLPHVEHJDQQHDUO\DFHQWXU\DJRLQ&DPHURRQ´ 
17
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Invasive Species, http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/invasive/ (last updated
Nov. 20, 2009).
18
APHRODITE SMAGADI, MEDICINAL BIOPROSPECTING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFITSHARING    FRPPHQWLQJRQWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI³JHQHWLFUHVRXUFHVDVHFRQRPLFDOO\YDOXDEOH
DVVHWV´XQGHUWKUHDWIURPSRSXODWLRQJURZWK´ 
19
See Iceland to repay £2bn U K savings, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/8086997.stm (³Britain used anti-terrorism laws to freeze the assets of Icelandic banks,
ZKLFKKDGFROODSVHGLQWKHZDNHRIILQDQFLDOFULVLV´ 
20
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 20-33 (Chris Wold et. al eds., 2009).
21
RONALD WRIGHT, A SHORT HISTORY OF PROGRESS 39 (2004) (writing about hunting in the Upper
3DOHROLWKLFSHULRG5RQDOG:ULJKWQRWHV³>W@KHperfection of hunting spelled the end of hunting as a way
RIOLIH´ 
22
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Cli mate Change Justice , 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1575 (2008).
23
FRANCK, supra note 7, at 353.
16
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eight nations in order to draft an Accord,24 the Conference of the Parties
UHVSRQGHGE\PHUHO\³WDNLQJQRWH´RIWKH$FFRUGSHUKDSVLQSURWHVWWRWKH
procedural slight.25 In the absence of a global mechanism, local or regional
initiatives are the source of carbon reduction commitments.26 These days,
developing nations effectively insert demands for moral and practical
consideration into negotiations on global threats. Combined with the
increased diversity and power of these threats, it is not hard to see why
climate change negotiations have broken down.

B.

Stalled Distribution Efforts

Despite widespread understanding of the risks posed by global
threats such as epidemics or systematic financial risks, as well as the
dependence of global prosperity on interconnected systems, recent efforts
to distribute resources to reduce risks and protect the drivers of well-being
have stopped far short of their goals. Most recently, negotiators who hoped
to craft the next chapter to the Kyoto Protocol (which expires in 2012) went
home to face a volley of commentary on just how much they had failed.
Other long-term projects, such as global trade talks and the ratification of
the International Seed Treaty or the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
have also lost momentum.
$V WKH HQG RI .\RWR¶V FRPPLWPHQW SHULRG DSSURDFKHG 1*2V
ministers, and eventually heads of state gathered to resolve the fate of the
Protocol. The Copenhagen Conference, with 40,000 attendees, was one of
the largest environmental gatherings in history. With one hundred heads of
VWDWHV LQ DWWHQGDQFH ³+RSHQKDJHQ´ UHVXOWHG QRW LQ D JHQHUDO OHJDO
agreement, but an Accord of ZKLFK WKH &RQIHUHQFH ³WRRN QRWH´27 The
$FFRUGLQFOXGHG³DORQJ-term goal of limiting climate change to no more
WKDQ  & V\VWHPV RI µSOHGJH DQG UHYLHZ¶ IRU ERWK GHYHORSHG DQG
developing country mitigation commitments or actions; and significant new
ILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV´28 7KH$FFRUG³ZDVUHDFKHGDPRQJ3DUWLHVWRWKH

See Lavanya Rajamani, The Making And Unmaking Of The Copenhagen Accord, 59 INT¶L & COMP.
L. Q. 824, 825 (2010).
25
Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Cli mate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem, 104 AM. J. INT¶L L.
230, 231 (2010).
26
See Kristina Robinson, Chicago Cli mate Exchange to Cease Operations, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Nov. 25,
2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/11/chicago-climate-exchange-cease-operations (commenting
that Europe and California are the locations where carbon trading is active).
27
Bodansky, supra note 25.
28
Id. at 1.
24
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FCCC, including all major emitters and economies, as well as those
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHPRVWYXOQHUDEOHDQGOHDVWGHYHORSHG´29
Nations at the subsequent Cancun Conference approved the
financing target of $100 billion for developing nations along with a plan
that would protect forests and develop methods to verify emissions
reductions.30 Every country except Bolivia agreed to this proposal.31
Climate change negotiators looked forward to Durban, South Africa, in
2011, for the final chance to extend the Kyoto Protocol before it expires in
2012. The market for carbon reduction credits is already shrinking in the
face of uncertainty about the next round of emissions reductions,32 and the
window for achieving low-cost carbon abatement is closing rapidly.33
Negotiators approached the conference in Durban without a resolution, let
alone a road map towards resolution.
The stalemate in Cancun came on the heels of similar speed bumps
in implementing two specific framework agreements²the International
Seed Treaty and the Convention on the Law of the Sea²and a deep freeze
in negotiations on the world trade system. The United States, in particular,
has not signed the International Seed Treaty or the Convention on the Law
of the Sea due to concerns about distributive justice, despite having taken
an active role in the design of both frameworks.34 However, the United
States has been advocating for the advance of the Doha Development
Agenda, which replaced the Uruguay Round of global trade talks. The
meeting of GATT members in 1982, which launched the Uruguay Round
of QHJRWLDWLRQV ZDV ³ZLGHO\ UHJDUGHG DV DIDLOXUH´35 In the early 1990s,
WUDGHWDONV³OXUFKHGEHWZHHQLPSHQGLQJIDLOXUHWRSUHGLFWLRQVRILPPLQHQW
Rajamani, supra note 24DW0XFKLVQRWVSHFLILHGLQWKH$FFRUG³>W@he Accord neither
TXDQWLILHVWKHµGHHSFXWV¶QHHGHGWRUHDFKWKHGHJUHH&JRDOQRULQGLFDWHVKRZWKHEXUGHQZLOOEH
shared between States. It does not specify a benchmark from which the 2 degree C increase is to be
MXGJHG DVIRULQVWDQFHµIURPSUH-indusWULDOOHYHOV¶ RUSUHVFULEHDVSHFLILHGSHDNLQJ\HDURUWLPHIUDPH
OHDYLQJWKHVHLQVWHDGWREHGHWHUPLQHGE\6WDWHV´ Id. at 827.
30
Alex Morales et al., Global Warming Deal Decades Away as `Dysfunctional' U.S. Delays
Commitment, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1213/global-warming-deal-decades-away-as-dysfunctional-u-s-delays-commitment.html.
31
Louise Gray, Cancun cli mate change summit: Bolivians dance to a different beat, but fail to derail
the talks, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 12, 2010, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8197539/Cancun-climate-changesummit-Bolivians-dance-to-a-different-beat-but-fail-to-derail-the-talks.html.
32
Morales, supra note 30.
33
MCKINSEY & CO., IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON CARBON ECONOMICS 11, Ex. 9 (2010)
(noting that beginning abatement actions in 2020 would make it challenging to limit global warming to
3 degrees Celsius).
34
See infra text accompanying notes 204-208.
35
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, The Uruguay Round,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (noting
that the talks were supposed to extend the trading system to trade in services, intellectual property,
textiles, and agriculture).
29
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VXFFHVV´36 Talks in the Doha Development Agenda have struggled to
reach agreement. A global trade optimist describes how negotiations have
³FDUHHQHGEHWZHHQUHWUHQFKPHQWVVHWEDFNVDQGIDLOXUHVVLQFHWKHLUODXQFK
LQ 1RYHPEHU ´37 Topics that prompt truly bitter wrangling, such as
the relationship between trade and investment, have been dropped from the
Doha Agenda altogether.38

C.

The Impact of a Missing Theory of Distribution

Many forces caused the timid, yet controversial proposals to
replace the Kyoto Protocol, the downward spiral of global trade talks, and
the stilted progress towards protecting biological diversity on the high seas.
The most important cause is the lack of a theory of distribution to guide the
QHJRWLDWLRQVDQGVROXWLRQV³>W@KH.\RWR3URWRFRO VIDLOXUHFDQEHWUDFHGLQ
no small measure to the lack of real agreement on burden sharing or who
VKRXOGSD\IRUHPLVVLRQVFRQWUROVDQGZKRVKRXOGUHFHLYHWKHEHQHILWV´39
These debates are rooted in deeply-held beliefs about equity and
distributional justice.40 International law scholars often discuss distributive
justice in the context of other taxonomies to understand the question of
how to equitably allocate resources. These taxonomies include corrective
justice,41 corrective equity, broadly conceived equity, and common heritage
equity.42 7KH\ PD\ EH RUJDQL]HG E\ µGR QR KDUP¶43 µVKDUH WKH Fommon
KHULWDJH RI PDQNLQG¶44 µSROOXWHU SD\V¶45 µYLFWLP SD\V²as the primary
Id.
Richard Baldwin, Global trade talks: Doha is doable this year , E. ASIA FORUM (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/01/global-trade-talks-doha-is-doable-this-year/.
38
7KH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQL]DWLRQGHILQHV³UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWUDGHDQGLQYHVWPHQW´DVWKH³QHHGWR
balance the interests of countries where foreign investment originates and where it is invested,
counWULHV¶ULJKWWRUHJXODWHLQYHVWPHQWGHYHORSPHQWSXEOLFLQWHUHVWDQGLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWULHV¶VSHFLILF
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, The Doha Agenda ,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm#singapore (last visited Apr. 16,
2011). Especially in the global trade context, re-examining the role of law in distribution is prompted
partly by a failure of neoliberalism. A role for law in distribution is needed to improve the infrastructure
of markets, correct market failures, provide social goods, and include the rule of law in the definition of
development. THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 10-11 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaros Santos eds., 2006).
39
Daniel C. Esty, Breaking the Environmental Law Logja m : The International Di mension, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 836, 852 (2008).
40
E.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22DW DUJXLQJWKDW³WKHFOLPDWHFKDQJHSUREOHPSRRUO\ILWV
the corrective justice model, because the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many
people who have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have not been
YLFWLPL]HG´ 
41
See id. at 1572.
42
FRANCK, supra note 7, at 57.
43
See id. at 357.
44
See id. at 358.
45
Id. at 361.
36
37

110

CHI.-KENT J. INT¶L & COMP. L.

Vol. XII

EHQHILFLDU\¶46 or based on ability to pay.47 However, no consistent theory
or school of distributive justice guides negotiations towards global
solutions.
The failure to renegotiate the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates the lack
of a theory of distribution in international law. As soon as the ink was dry
on the Kyoto Protocol, it became apparent that the negotiated division of
countries into Annex I and non-Annex I only set the stage for further
battles over moral responsibility and financial liability, and could not be
understood as proof that countries had reached a consensus on allocation.48
The starting point of Kyoto was highly skewed: the United States emits
24.5 metric tons of CO2 per capita, while India and China emit 1.9 and 3.9
respectively.49 Although the West is responsible for the vast majority of
cumulative emissions, China and the developing world are catching up.
China has surpassed the United States as the greatest annual emitter.50 On
top of this shifting foundation, the Kyoto Protocol overlaid property rights
in the form of permits.51 The monetization of permits created value of
about $2 trillion, and the political and economic consequences of the
allocation of that value became apparent.52 One Kyoto skeptic argued that
³>L@QDVLQJOHDFWWKH.\RWRVHVVLRQFUHDWHGDKLJKO\DPELWLRXVDJUHHPHQW
that requires a completely novel form of international financing to succeed,
DQG QR FRQVHQVXV RQ KRZ WR LPSOHPHQW WKDW VFKHPH´53 He predicts that
.\RWRZLOOSURYHWREHDQDEHUUDWLRQ³QRWSURRIWKDWLWLVIHDVLEOHWRKDQG
RXW DQG VHFXUH DVVHWV ZRUWK WULOOLRQV RI GROODUV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´54
Id. at 361. For example, a traditional market model would call for higher prices to be paid per unit
(say clean water) for initial units based on their higher value to the user. Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable
Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2120-31 (2005).
47
FRANCK, supra note 7, at 368.
48
VICTOR, supra note 11, at 25. Victor adds that the United States immediately began pressing for
meaningful emissions reductions from developing countries; Senate resolutions in 1997 and 1998 called
for specific commitments, and U.S. diplomats pressed for binding commitments from developing
countries. Id. at 34.
49
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 135.
50
China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html
51
VICTOR, supra note 11, at 29.
52
Id. at 50-51.
53
Id. at 29.
54
Id. Victor is skeptical about many aspects of international law. He argues that countries with skilled
negotiators, such as Russia and Ukraine, get a better deal in their base years. Id. at 30. Distribution
schemes would require long-term contracts with developing countries, which are unenforceable in
international law. Id. at 38-39. Also, it is not possible to predict abatement costs and future emissions to
DOORFDWHSHUPLWV³H[DFWO\´ Id. at 51. Eric Posner argues that countries might abide by long term
REOLJDWLRQVQRWEHFDXVHRIREOLJDWLRQEXWEHFDXVHRILQFHQWLYHV³VWDWHVVKRXOGFRRSHUDWHZLWKHDFK
other in order to produce supranational (regional or global) public goods such as climate control and
trade. There is no such obligation to cooperate because states have strong nonlegal incentives to
cooperate, but there is an important regime governing the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of
WUHDWLHV´3RVQHUsupra note 9, at 522. An agreement on distribution of permits, for example, would
46
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Even without such skepticism, it is clear that Kyoto attempted to distribute
value across borders without a sufficiently rigorous theory to justify this
distribution.
Posner and Sunstein have attempted to import a tort-based model
of climate change liability in order to remedy this lack of a theory of
distributive justice. They argue that ³WKH FOLPDWH FKDQJH SUREOHP SRRUO\
fits the corrective justice model, because the consequence of tort-like
thinking would be to force many people who have not acted wrongfully to
SURYLGHDUHPHG\WRPDQ\SHRSOHZKRKDYHQRWEHHQYLFWLPL]HG´55 Posner
and Sunstein argue that climate change justice is rooted in corrective
justice, which is understood to be reparations for past harm, and they raise
questions of causality, of standing, and of the relative contributions of one
household or the United States as a whole.56 They argue against collective
responsibility imputed to Americans as a class.57 Unfortunately, as Posner
and Sunstein themselves recognize, their tort analogy for corrective justice,
even if technically correct in its mapping of questions of causality and
group responsibility, does not reflect the current debate on climate change.
Moreover, their suggestion is unlikely to resolve deeply divergent views of
equity and distributional justice, regarding climate change or anything else,
perhaps because it captures little of the ethical or moral arguments raised
by a response to shared threats.58
Whether the problem is climate change, global trade, the loss of
biodiversity, or loss of life to global pandemics, the solution required will
be far more complex than bilateral resource sharing mechanisms in terms
of geographic, industrial, and jurisdictional scope.59 Efforts to transplant
also require an agreement on the role of international law and its relation to the underlying goals of the
international framework. See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 9-10.
55
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1592.
56
Id. at 1592-1600.
57
Id. at 1593. The climate change problem, they argue, also fits poorly into traditional understandings
of distributive justice. Payments for carbon emission reduction are hardly justified by distributive
justice as other forms of transfers might help poor people more, help the current poor more the future
poor, or avoid the drawback that the price of carbon reduction may fall disproportionately on the United
States poor. Id. at 1583-86.
58
In the domestic context, the tort analogy has gained more traction. The Supreme Court recently heard
DUJXPHQWVRQZKHWKHU³FRmpanies accused of emitting greenhouse gases can be held liable under public
QXLVDQFHODZV´ Gil Keteltas, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Connecticut v. AEP , GLOBAL CLIMATE L.
BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/2010/12/articles/climate-changelitigation/supreme-court-grants-cert-in-connecticut-v-aep/. The Court will examine the Second
&LUFXLW¶VKROGLQJWKDWWKHQXLVDQFHFODLPVDUHQRWEDUUHGE\WKHSROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQGRFWULQHDPRQJRWKHU
defenses. See Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co. , 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). In contrast, Franck
emphasizes that assignment of liability for international environmental harm is both a moral and an
economic decision. See FRANCK, supra note 7, at 354.
59
See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 3DW QRWLQJWKH³FRQFXUUHQWULVHRIERWKLQWHUQDWLRQDO-scale
autocracy and regional-VFDOHHPSRZHUPHQWDQGGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ´  id. at 341 (discussing law,
jurisdiction, geographic scale and democratization).

112

CHI.-KENT J. INT¶L & COMP. L.

Vol. XII

distributive frameworks from domestic law have been less than satisfying.
Any number of arguments could be made about why these transplants have
been rejected, such as the lack of consensus, or even a framework for
consensus. However, the bitter debates about culpability and liability for
global risks are their own best evidence of a missing theory of distribution
in international law. As the survey of distributive frameworks in Part II
reveals, the proper role of international law in distributing risks and
rewards among nations has been of prime concern in negotiations; aversion
to the distributive nature of various agreements has motivated the next
iteration of global response.

D.

A Note on Measurement

Before outlining the components of a theory of distribution and
their application to international law, it is important to recognize that any
theory of distribution must include a position on what measures are to be
weighed in assessing the relative advantages conveyed by each theory.60
Does a theory weigh income? Wealth? Longevity? The rule of law?61
What is the unit of analysis? Is it an individual, a family, or a village?
Gross National Income is a common proxy for well-being around the
world.62 It may be supplemented by assessments of life expectancy,63
gender equality,64 political inclusion,65 and the like.66 Amartya Sen argues
for a measure of distributional equity based on opportunity as the freedom
to achieve reasoned ends²the capability to do things that one has reason to
value²rather than an assessment of primary goods, which are means at

See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009).
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 9.
62
See The World Bank, How We Classify Countries, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last YLVLWHG)HE  ³)RURSHUDWLRQDO
DQGDQDO\WLFDOSXUSRVHVWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VPDLQFULWHULRQIRUFODVVLI\LQJHFRQRPLHVLVJURVVQDWLRQDO
LQFRPH *1, SHUFDSLWD´ 
63
See CIA, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Life Expectancy at Birth, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2011).
64
See World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap, (2010) available at
http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap (measuring gender equality by economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political attainment).
65
See CHANGING PATHS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW POLITICS OF INCLUSION 1
(Peter P. Houtzager & Mick Moore eds., 2003).
66
The new 2010 Human Development Index uses a composite of three factors: health (life expectancy
at birth), knowledge (years of schooling) and income (purchasing power adjusted Gross National
Income). See United Nations Development Program, Human Development Index F requently Asked
Questions, (2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_HDI_FAQs.pdf.
60
61
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best.67 The selection of criteria and information determines the deficiencies
that are deemed worthy of remedy.
A measurement of advantage often focuses on what Sen would call
the opportunity aspects of freedom, rather than the process aspects.68
Participation in the discussions that lead to redistributive frameworks is one
measure of advantage. However, this Article focuses on how to justify the
outcome of distributive arrangements and the relative opportunities that
they create, rather than the means by which they were designed. Sen calls
this agnosticism towards means a narrow understanding of opportunity, the
SURGXFWRIDV\VWHPKHFDOOVWKH³FXOPLQDWLRQRXWFRPH´, or what one person
receives in a distributive framework.69 Sen argues that, instead of
considering freedom of choice to be unimportant, one should look to a
³FRPSUHKHQVLYH RXWFRPH´ ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK D SHUVRQ
reaches the culmination outcome.70 However, a narrow focus on outcome
FRUUHVSRQGV ZLWK )UDQFN¶V SULRULWLHV LQ DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI IDLUQHVV  +H
writes that
[t]he fairness of international law . . . will be judged, first
E\ WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKH UXOHV VDWLVI\ WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and
benefits, and secondly by the extent to which the rules are
made and applied in accordance with what the participants
perceive as right process.71
This Article does not take a position on the proper measure of advantage.
5DWKHULWUHFRJQL]HVWKDWUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHURQHPHDVXUHVE\%KXWDQ¶V
Gross National Happiness72 or by access to electricity,73 the choice of
categories to measure will be dispositive for decisions about how to
distribute.

SEN, supra note 60, at 234. Sen goes on to argue that this is also true in the context of environmental
sustainability, where we should focus on how the environment enables people to live the lives they
value. Id. at 248. Franck volunteers that the purposes of international environmental law are maximum
sustainable development, redressing imbalances, and preserving and extending the good life. FRANCK,
supra note 7, at 364.
68
See SEN, supra note 60, at 228-29.
69
Id. at 215.
70
Id. at 230.
71
See FRANCK, supra note 7, at 7. For a discussion of the second factor ²legitimacy as procedural
justice, and its role in determining the fairness of an allocative regime ² see id. at 25-26.
72
See Andrew C. Revkin, A New Measure of Well-being from a Happy Little Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2005.
73
See Samar Elsayed, Energy Access for Development , WORLD RES. INST. (May 12, 2005, 17:05 PM),
available at http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/339.
67
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M apping C ur rent F ramewor ks

According to some scholars, the weakness or imperfection of
redistributive treaties should be expected, but this expectation is not a
complete or accurate description of the work being done by the distributive
function of international law.74 The rapidly approaching end of the Kyoto
Protocol and the vitriolic protests surrounding trade negotiations may warm
the heart of international law pessimists. However, the protests, the stalled
negotiations, the damage, and the potential solutions all emerge from a rich
tradition of distribution of resources in international law. This tradition is
poorly understood, unfairly ignored, and replete with useful principles,
frameworks, and successes.
A survey of frameworks for the distribution of resources through
international law will shed some light on the distributive function of
international law.75 These frameworks move resources between states to
compensate for wrongs (via claims tribunals and diplomatic espousal), to
meet an urgent need, to invest in the international system, and to recognize
common heritage. Some frameworks are motivated by two or more of
these principles. It may be surprising that so many resources are
redistributed every day via international legal frameworks. The fights
about responsibility, culpability, and ability in the context of negotiations
on climate change or other challenges help to clarify the as-yet ambiguous
norms and practices guiding distribution in international law. Perhaps
overlooked in these heated debates is a tradition of distribution of resources
through international law that offers at least some reasons for optimism.
The following survey describes these distributive frameworks and traces
how they have been constructed in dialogue with one another.
74

Broadly conceived, the environment, trade, and development are common targets of distributive
frameworks. See FRANCK, supra note 7DW8QJHUH[SDQGVWKDW³DUJXPHQWVGealing with the
perverse distributive effects of free trade in a particular situation [include] both distribution among
VHFWRUVRIWKHHFRQRP\DQGGLVWULEXWLRQDPRQJFODVVHVRIVRFLHW\´ UNGER, supra note 10, at 11.
Unger organizes traditional objections to free trade into two categories: arguments for restraints on
trade, and arguments based on distributive effects. Id. at 10-11. On distributive justice and trade, see
also ALBINO BERRERA, GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC ETHICS: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2007) (organizing arguments for distributive justice according to criteria of
efficiency, need, and entitlement); ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AN UNFAIR WORLD:
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD    ³LWDSSHDUVWKDWLGHDVRIIDLUQHVVRURIWUDGHDVDV\VWHP
of mutual advantage, have played a role in shaping the international trade regime, even if less
completely than one would wish if that arrangement were to be accepted as being jXVW´ 
75
International legal frameworks, much like domestic legal systems, have distributional effects. See,
e.g., David Kennedy, The Rule of Law, Political Choices, and Development Common Sense , in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 95 (on the distributional consequences of
legal systems, often described more clearly with economic rationale). This is true even though
development experts might like to think their recommendations, and the distributional consequences,
were not political choices, but rather imperatives of their expertise. Id. at 97.
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International law distributes resources through a variety of
frameworks²some novel, such as the International Seed Treaty, and some,
such as the Universal Postal Union, so well-established and effective that it
is hard to imagine the world without them. Compensation for wrongs,
articulated through diplomatic espousal76 or claims tribunals, resembles
compensation payments familiar from national systems.
Certain
distributive frameworks justify themselves out of necessity, and respond to
exigencies such as the HIV/AIDS crisis or the perceived µodious debts¶ of
highly indebted poor countries.
Investments in postal systems,
telecommunications, biological diversity, and arms control provide global
public goods²the infrastructure of the global system. Finally, some
frameworks call for a distribution of resources in favor of developing
QDWLRQVLQUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHµFRPPRQKHULWDJHRIPDQNLQG¶$VFRPSOH[
as each of these is, some frameworks embody more than one governing
principle. Over the past hundred years, the global community has
experimented with myriad frameworks for distribution of resources. More
recent attempts demonstrate admirable ambition, and have incited
seemingly intractable challenges to their theoretical underpinnings and
practical application.

A.

Compensation

Distribution occurs through international law to compensate for
harm inflicted on private property rights.77 This compensation may come in
the form of payments or restoration of property to an individual investor,
and is often collected through means of diplomatic espousal. Although the
amount in question may be hotly contested, the liability of states for some
measure of compensation for harm to private property remains a timetested pillar of distribution in international law.
For at least the past hundred years, the United States has supported
WKH SULQFLSOH WKDW D VWDWH RQ EHKDOI RI QDWLRQDOV ³FDQ H[HUFLVH GLSORPDWLF
protection on their behalf ZKHQWKH\KDYHVXIIHUHGGLUHFWORVVHV´78 In 2007
WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH ³IROORZHG´  FDVHV LQ ZKLFK 86 FLWL]HQV KDG

76

Diplomatic espousal is the mechanism by which a state persuades another state to provide
compensation for a harm suffered by one of its nationals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902(2) (1987).
77
This discussion does not touch on reparations exchanged between states in recognition of violations
of public international law, or to amend for widespread losses in warfare. See ISTVAN CASARHELYI,
RESTITUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1964) (describing how Germany and her allies paid
reparations to repair the losses caused by the war unleashed by them).
78
2007 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8, at 419.
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requested diplomatic assistance with investment disputes,79 and the State
Department office that handles investment claims and disputes is the
largest office in the Department of State's Office of the Legal Adviser.80
'LSORPDWLF HVSRXVDO LV EDVHG RQ WKH SULQFLSOH WKDW ³WKH VWDWH ZKRVH
nationals are the owners of the shares of a foreign corporation may
interpose on their behalf in case the corporation suffers wrong at the hands
of a foreign state when those nationals have no remedy except through the
LQWHUYHQWLRQRIWKHLURZQJRYHUQPHQW´81 Although countries might dispute
the merits of the claims espoused through diplomatic means,82 there is little
controversy about the right of a government to request compensation for
harm to private property of their nationals.
Although a victorious state used to enjoy the spoils of war,83 that
ability is constrained nowadays by treaty and by customary international
law. The Hague Convention IV of 1907 articulated the legal obligation of
restitution of private property seized in war.84 After World War I, Germany
and her allies were obliged to restore private property damaged due to
discriminatory measures.85 The treaties that ended World War II included
distinct categories of claims: restoration of private property and reparations
to states due to responsibility for war.86
After the Iranian Revolution, Iran and the United States,
negotiating through Algeria, agreed on a mechanism to adjudicate claims
arising from losses to private property when those losses were attributable
to the Iranian Government.87 The claims arrangement consisted of a
Security Account out of which U.S. claimants would be paid and a Claims
Tribunal to adjudicate those claims.88
Although the need for some form of compensation for wrongs was
not in dispute, the extent of the distribution required by the compensation
QRUP KDV EHHQ KRWO\ FRQWHVWHG  7KH ³WUDGLWLRQDO VWDQGDUG´ RI D VWDWH¶V
Hearing of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Serial No. 110-222, at 13 (July 17, 2008) (statement of
David R. Nelson, U.S. Department of State).
80
See The Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes
(L/CID), U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3433.htm (last visited Sept 26, 2010).
81
5 GREEN HAYWORD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6 at 841 (1943).
82
SeeIRUH[DPSOHILJKWVRYHU³SHUPDQHQWVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV´DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § ***, at 489.
83
CASARHELYI, supra note 77, at 29.
84
Id. at 30.
85
Id. at 35. These obligations are distinct from the reparations due to the victorious states as a result of
the war.
86
Id. at 45.
87
See RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: CONTROVERSIES, CASES
AND CONTRIBUTION 157 (1990) (excluded from the mandate were claims by the hostages, or acts not
carried out by the Government).
88
See THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1998).
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obOLJDWLRQ ZDV WR SURYLGH ³µSURPSW DGHTXDWH DQG HIIHFWLYH¶
FRPSHQVDWLRQ´ DIWHU H[SURSULDWLRQ RU QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ89 By the launch of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, however, that standard of compensation was
under attack.90 The U.N. Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over
1DWXUDO5HVRXUFHVRIWDONHGDERXW³DSSURSULDWHFRPSHQVDWLRQ´UDWKHU
WKDQ ³IXOO FRPSHQVDWLRQ´ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK GRPHVWLF DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
law.91 The U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974
dropped the reference WRLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQGRQO\PHQWLRQHG³DSSURSULDWH
FRPSHQVDWLRQ´LQOLJKWRIGRPHVWLFODZ92 The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is
credited with reinforcing the principle of valuation as a going concern;93
even in such a contentious dispute, the obligation of a state to compensate
for wrongs was unchallenged.94

B.

Necessity

The principle of necessity motivates distribution of resources for
old arrangements, such as sovereign debt and debt relief, and for novel
arrangements, such as access to essential medicines.95 When faced with
stark, alarming circumstances of human suffering, necessity motivates a
rebalancing of resources to achieve morally acceptable outcomes. Posner,
DOPRVW LQ VXUSULVH UHFRJQL]HV WKDW ³PDQ\ HOHPHQWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
reflect altruistic concern for the well-being of people living across
ERUGHUV´96 The motivation of this distribution may be exacerbated by the
odiousness of the origins of suffering²such as debts incurred by dictators
for personal, rather than public, benefit²and may be mitigated somewhat
by efficiency concerns in implementation.
1.

Sovereign Debt and Sovereign Investments

David P. Stewart, Compensation and Valuation Issues, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL, supra note 888, at 327.
90
See KHAN, supra note 87, DW ,UDQDUJXLQJIRU³QHWERRNYDOXH´ZLWKRXWSRWHQWLDOIRUIXWXUH
profits); id. DW FODLPDQWVZDQWLQJ³DVJRRGDQHFRQRPLFSRVLWLRQDVLWZDVEHIRUHWKH
H[SURSULDWLRQ´ Stewart, supra note 89, at 325.
91
Stewart, supra note 89, at 330.
92
Id. at 331.
93
KHAN, supra note 87, at 218.
94
$WPRVW,UDQDUJXHGWKDWDVWKHQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQZDVOHJDOLWZDVRQO\OLDEOHIRU³QHWERRNYDOXH´DV
compensation, not future profits. Id. at 231.
95
See DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH ¶¶ 4-6 (Nov. 2001),
available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf (on compulsory licenses for
essential medicines during national emergencies or in circumstances of extreme urgency).
96
Posner, supra note 9, at 521.
89
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The practice of state-to-state lending is not at all new, although it
has changed in form and in extent over the past hundred years. States take
on debt in exchange for foreign reserves with which to meet their domestic
priorities, such as building infrastructure (under an ideal conception), to
wage war, or to line the pockets of government officials (under an
unfortunately common origin of sovereign debt obligations). Although the
restructuring of sovereign debt is a more recent addition to distribution
under international law than compensation for wrongs, it similarly relies on
arguments of moral force.
Sovereign debt is an interesting example of redistribution, as
³>G@HEW KDV EHHQ WKH ODUJHVW VRXUFH RI IRUHLJQ FDSLWDO WR GHYHORSLQJ
FRXQWULHV LQ WKH SDVW  \HDUV´97 In the 1920s, sovereign debt primarily
took the form of bonds.98 By the 1970s and 1980s, Western banks, looking
for a profitable return on their extensive deposits from oil exporters, lent to
VRYHUHLJQ ERUURZHUV ZLWKRXW ³QRUPDO FDXWLRQDU\ LQTXLULHV´99 Following
this exuberance, syndicated loans were again replaced by bonds, due to the
inability of developing countries to stay current on their extensive debt
burdens.100 Lenders conventionally restructured VRYHUHLJQ GHEW ³E\
rearranging amortization schedules as well as writing off the debt
principal.´101 However, WKH UHPHG\ RI ³SURYLGLQJ GHEW VHUYLFH UHOLHI
through a combination of rescheduling the principal and compulsory new
money infusions ha[d] EHHQYLUWXDOO\H[KDXVWHGIRUPDQ\GHEWRUFRXQWULHV´
meaning that the principals of the loans themselves were under threat.102
As debt burdens mounted towards the turn of the millennium, a
campaign²started by Christian communities and embraced by a broad
international coalition²called for debt relief for the poorest countries.103
The result of this remarkably successful movement was debt relief
commitments from the World Bank, IMF, and various countries.104 The
United States House of Representatives passed the Debt Relief for Poverty
Reduction Act, tying debt relief to reforms, poverty reduction, and
sustainable development.105 Commentators borrowed heavily from Old
97

RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 105 (2009).
Id.
99
See AUGUST REINISCH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEBTS 9 (1995).
100
See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 105. Moreover, Reinisch explains that this debt crisis
can be traced to oil price shocks, the poor state of the world economy, a sharp increase in interest rates
in the 1980s, and capital flight by developing country elites. See REINISCH, supra note 99, at 8-11.
101
OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 106.
102
Id.
103
See Yale School of Management, The Ca mpaign in the U.S.,
http://cases.som.yale.edu/jubilee/index.php?page=7&subMenu= (last visited May 29, 2011).
104
See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 159 (on the World Bank and IMF Highly Indebted Poor
Countries initiative).
105
Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 1095, H.R. REP. NO. 106-483 (1999).
98
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Testament concepts of restoration and a fresh start.106 In addition to the
religious connotation, part of the motivation for debt relief was a reaction
against ³RGLRXVGHEWV´107 The idea of odious debts was originally a means
for repudiating debt under circumstances of state succession, when the debt
ZDV LQFXUUHG E\ D ³GHVSRWLF´ JRYHUQPHQW DQG citizens had not benefited
from the loans.108 The idea of odious debts has been expanded to include
³GHEWV IURP DQ RGLRXV UHJLPH´109 RU HYHQ ³LOOHJLWLPDWH GHEWV,´ ZKLFK DUH
incurred by non±democratic, corrupt governments against the interests of
the people who must pay them back.110 If sovereign debts have been one of
the largest sources of foreign capital for developing countries, debt relief
was one of the most successful redistributive efforts in recent memory.111
It is all the more surprising that the debt relief movement, which was
almost entirely justified as a moral or religious obligation on the part of
developed countries, was so successful, given resistance to previous
distributive efforts based on arguments for the common heritage of
mankind.112
2.

Access to Essential Medicines

Although most pharmaceutical products were not designed with the
needs of poor people in mind, existing medicines could prevent some of the
eighteen million deaths a year from causes such as nutritional defects,
communicable diseases, and maternal and perinatal conditions.113 The fact
that generic manufacturers could make these medicines affordable, but are
prevented from doing so by intellectual property regimes, 114 has prompted
Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act: Hearing on H.R. 1095 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
F inancial Services, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of James A. Leach, Chairman).
107
See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 169.
108
See Odette Lienau, Who Is the " Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting A Rule-of-Law
F ra mework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 63, 65 (2008).
109
See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 977, at 172.
110
See id. at 183; Joseph Kahn, Leaders in Congress Agree to Debt Relief for Poor Nations, N.Y.
TIMES2FW ³/HDGHUVRIGHYHORSLng nations have been pressing for donor nations to forgive
past debts, arguing that many of the debts were incurred by earlier -- and often corrupt -- governments
WKDWPLVXVHGDLG´ 
111
See Joshua William Busby, Bono Made Jesse Hel ms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral
Action in International Politics, 51 INT¶L STUD. Q   ³VRPHVWDWHVDFWHGFRQWUDU\WRWKHLU
narrow material interests, apparently at the behest of a transnational advocacy group . . . . Two
economists called the campaign µE\IDUWKHPRVWVXFFHVVIXOLQGXVWULDO-country movement aimed at
FRPEDWLQJZRUOGSRYHUW\IRUPDQ\\HDUVSHUKDSVLQDOOUHFRUGHGKLVWRU\¶´ 
112
See discussion infra , Section III.D.
113
Thomas Pogge et al., Access to Essential Medicines: Public Health and International Law, in
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 4-5
(Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES].
114
Effectively, the grace period during which developing countries can get cheaper generics without
violating TRIPS obligations on patent licenses has been extended to January, 2016. See Andrew D.
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concerted calls for a rebalancing of international intellectual property law
away from developed country drug companies and in favor of developing
country poor people.
Developing countries originally agreed to abide by the rigorous
protections of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(³TRIPS´ LQRUGHU³WRJDLQFRQFHVVLRQVIURPULFK[countries] in other areas
RIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\ RUIRUJUHDWHUDLG ´115 Article 31 of TRIPS allows a
country, ZLWKRXW WKH SDWHQW KROGHU¶V FRQVHQW, to manufacture or import a
medicine, as long as the rights holder is paid adequate compensation and
the use is predominantly for the domestic market. The developing country
is also required to try to obtain a voluntary license, except in extreme
emergencies.116 This provision is not nearly as generous as it seems, as
most poor countries lack manufacturing capabilities and would have to
import generics. In order for the generics to be truly low cost, they would
need to be manufactured under compulsory license, in, for example,
Canada. But in order for Canada to obtain that compulsory license, the
PHGLFLQH PXVW EH LQWHQGHG IRU &DQDGD¶V GRPHVWLF PDUNHW WKLV FUHDWHV D
Catch-22 which renders the entire system absurd.117
Responding to the pressures to eliminate this absurdity, the WTO
in August 2003 decided that any member country could export medicines
subject to a compulsory license, but with some protections.118 This
agreement, incorporated into TRIPS, was only supported by 20 countries
and the EU.119 It has been criticized as ineffective and many drugexporting countries have not passed implementing legislation on
compulsory licenses.120 The first, and so far only, export of drugs under
compulsory license took place from Canada to Rwanda in September
2008.121 Although halting and modest in its achievements to date, the
access to essential medicines regime, motivated by urgent need in
developing countries, represents an international legal framework to
distribute the gains from intellectual property in favor of developing
countries.

Mitchell & Tania Voon, The TRIPS Waiver as a Recognition of Public Health Concerns in the WTO , in
INCENTIVES, supra note 113, at 62. However, prior to TRIPS the US had put pressure on developing
countries to improve IP regimes, under threat of WTO sanctions. See APHRODITE SMAGADI,
MEDICINAL BIOPROSPECTING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 100 (2009).
115
Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng, Global Health and Development: Patents and Public Interest , in
INCENTIVES, supra note 1133, at 104.
116
Mitchell & Voon, supra note 1144, at 60.
117
Id. at 61.
118
INCENTIVES, supra note 1133, at 11.
119
Id. at 12.
120
Id.
121
Mitchell & Voon, supra note 1144, at 56.
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Investments in Global Public Goods

Among the oldest distributive frameworks in international law are
the ones designed to provide global public goods. The Universal Postal
Union, one of the oldest international institutions, has achieved its goal of
enabling global postal communication with such efficacy over the past
hundred years that it is often overlooked as an example of distribution in
international law. Additionally, international efforts to combat small arms
violence have distributed significant resources to vulnerable countries.
However, newer investments in global public goods, such as the
preservation of biological diversity in general, or seeds in particular, may
be short of the resources required to carry out their mandates and are
somewhat more fraught with disputes. The Convention on Biological
Diversity organizes resources and responsibilities in bilateral arrangements
between host countries and investors. Responding perhaps to the fifteen
years of work it took the Working Group of the Convention on Biological
Diversity to issue guidelines on access and benefits sharing, the
International Seed treaty instead employs a common fund out of which
benefits will be shared.
1.

Universal Postal Union

The Universal Postal Union (³UPU´) is one of the oldest
international institutions and a longstanding mechanism for distribution in
international law. It was established by the Treaty of Berne on October 9,
1874, and entered into force on July 1, 1875.122 The UPU was designed to
improve the efficiency and lower the cost of postal communications.
Previously, one would have had to affix domestic postage, transit fees, and
terminal dues for the destination country, calculated based on different
currencies and units of weight.123 The UPU introduced three substantial
innovations: (1) single postal territory and freedom of transit; (2) universal
service; and (3) a unified system for postal charges, transit charges, and
terminal dues.124
The UPU enables international mail flows by shifting postal
revenues from developed countries to developing ones. The UPU separates
developed and developing countries into two systems. The target system
covers international mail flows between developed countries, and the
WUDQVLWLRQ V\VWHP FRYHUV ³LQWHUQDWLRQal mail flows to, from and between
122

Mira Burri, Working Paper, International Regulation of Postal Communications (Jan. 22, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271786.
Id. at 2.
124
Id. ¶¶ 11-18.
123
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developing countries, following the classification of the United Nations
'HYHORSPHQW 3URJUDPPH´125 Developing countries receive preferential
rates under this system.126
In 2004, the UPU Congress agreed to design a system whereby the
countries in the transition system could join the target system. It also
vastly complicated the methodology for calculating preferential terminal
dues.127 Proposals offer a complex formula for setting terminal dues based
on gross national income, per letter delivery cost, macroeconomics, and a
country¶V VWDWXV as a small-island developing state or landlocked
developing state (if applicable).128 At about the same time as the Kyoto
Protocol was heavily criticized129 for imposing obligations based on a hard
line between developing or developed countries,130 the UPU was also
eschewing binary categories to drive distribution.
2.

Arms Control and Security

The United Nations Programme of Action (³PoA´) is the
organizing framework for small arms and light weapons (³SALW´)
assistance. The plague of SALW destabilizes fragile states, emboldens
drug dealers and terrorists, and threatens the lives of soldiers and police
trying to enforce order. SALW pass from conflict to conflict without
losing their deadly accuracy; working rifles from World War I have been
seized from the Afghan Taliban. In order to reduce the threat from SALW,
international assistance is part of all international and most regional small
arms and light weapons policy frameworks.131 The PoA asks that states
³VHULRXVO\ FRQVLGHU UHQGHULQJ DVVLVWDQFH LQFOXGLQJ WHFKQLFDODQG ILQDQFLDO
DVVLVWDQFHZKHUHQHHGHGVXFKDVVPDOODUPVIXQGV´132 From 2001 through

Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
127
Under the current terminal dues system: Least developed countries (LDCs) receive 16.5% of their
inward [terminal dues] from all other classes of countries. TRAC 1 countries (former DCs) pay 16.5%
to LDCs and receive 8% from industrialized countries (ICs). Net contributor countries (NCCs) pay
16.5% to LDCs and receive 1% from ICs. ICs receive no payments but pay 1% to NCCs, 8% to DCs
and 16.5% to LDCs.
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, THE UPU GLOBAL TERMINAL DUES SYSTEM PROPOSAL, Berne, ¶ 2 (21-22
Jan. 2008) [hereinafter TERMINAL DUES PROPOSAL].
128
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE FUTURE TERMINAL
DUES SYSTEM, CONGRÈS±Doc 19.Rev 1.Annexe 1, 24th Congress.
129
See supra, text accompanying note 48.
130
$OEHLWSKUDVHGDV³$QQH[I´RU³QRQ-Annex I´See infra , text accompanying note 213.
131
KELLY MAZE, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, SEARCHING FOR AID
EFFECTIVENESS IN SMALL ARMS ASSISTANCE 7 (2010).
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Id. at 8 (quoting the PoA § 3 ¶ b).
125
126

Stumbling Towards Distributive Justice

No. 1

123

 ³VWDWHV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQV SURYLGHG DSSUR[LPDWHO\ >@ PLOOLRQ RI
6$/:DVVLVWDQFH´133
3.

Convention on Biological Diversity

The Convention on Biological Diversity (³CBD´) of 1992 was
intended to preserve biological diversity, most of which is found in
developing countries, so that it may be used for food and medicinal
purposes by rich and poor countries alike. Without the CBD, intellectual
property regimes grant temporary exclusivity over biological resources to
whomever can isolate and purify them, which is most likely not the
developing countries.134 This imbalance in access to biological diversity
and ability to profit motivates the innovative benefits-sharing mechanism
of the CBD.
The CBD¶V goals are ³FRQVHUYDWLRQVXVWDLQDEOHXVHDQGHTXLWDEOH
sharing of benefits, part of which is appropriate access and appropriate
technology transfeU´135 Article 3 emphasizes sovereign rights over natural
resources within a jurisdiction, a provision designed specifically to dispel
³DQ\YHVWLJHRIWKHLGHDRIELRORJLFDOGLYHUVLW\DVWKHFRPPRQKHULWDJHRI
PDQNLQG´136 Article 15 requires biodiversity-rich countries to facilitate
access to genetic resources. Article 16 provides a reward of technology
WUDQVIHU LQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ IRU WKLV DFFHVV DQG ³$UWLFOHV  WR  REOLJDWH
parties to facilitate the exchange of information, promote technological and
scientific cooperation, and provide for the treatment of biotechnology and
GLVWULEXWLRQ RI EHQHILWV´137 Article 19, in particular, ³clearly announces
that in exchange for access to its biodiversity, the developing world will
receive a fair and equitable portion of the benefits that the North yields
IURPWKHLUXVH´138
Early implementation of the access and benefits-sharing provisions
was not encouraging. Costa Rica was the first country to exchange access
WRELRGLYHUVLW\IRULQYHVWPHQWLQFRQVHUYDWLRQD³GHEW IRUQDWXUH´VZDSLQ

Id. at 20.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, Jun. 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
818; Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their
Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
243, 244-46, 275, 281 (2006) (noting that the question of equitable sharing of the benefits of biological
diversity parallels the debate on distributive claims of developing countries for maritime resources.
Furthermore, countries are free under the CBD to interpret access and benefit sharing; countries
manifest concepts of equity based on procedural, retributive, and distributive principles).
135
See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 39.
136
FIONA MCCONNELL, THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 72 (1996).
137
See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 40.
138
Id.
133
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1991 between Merck and a national conservation organization, INBIO. 139
INBIO negotiated fourteen DJUHHPHQWV XQWLO LQ  D QHZ ³/DZ RI
%LRGLYHUVLW\´ VLJQDOOHG WKDW WKH UHJLPH ³LV WR EH PRUH UHVWULFWLYH DQG
controlling of the process oI QHJRWLDWLQJ DFFHVV DQG EHQHILWV´140 Mexico
signed four agreements, three of which ³IDFHG SROLWLFDO FKDOOHQJH OHJDO
XQFHUWDLQWLHV DQG WHUPLQDWLRQ EHIRUH DFFRPSOLVKPHQW´141 The one
FRPSOHWHGSURMHFWZDVQRWUHQHZHG³GXHWRWKHXQFOHDUUHJXODWRU\SRZHURI
WKHQDWLRQDO>DFFHVVDQGEHQHILWVVKDULQJ@IUDPHZRUN´142
Fleshing out the practical application of the benefits sharing
provision of the CBD took fifteen years and nine meetings of a dedicated
Working Group.143 The outcome of this work was presented in October
2010 to the Conference of Parties in Nagoya, Japan. The Nagoya Protocol
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising From Their Utilization envisions bilateral exchanges on
³PXWXDOO\ DJUHHG WHUPV´ of access to resources for monetary and nonmonetary benefits.144 The Protocol emphasizes consideration of women
and indigenous communities in decision-making and sharing of benefits
under these arrangements. It provides no more guidance as to how such
³PXWXDOO\DJUHHGWHUPV´DUHWREHGHWHUPLQHG
4.

International Seed Treaty

The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (³Seed
Treaty´) entered into force on June 29, 2004 and sought WR ³ensure
conservation and sustainable management of plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
DULVLQJ IURP WKHLU XVH´145 It replaced the International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources of 1983, which stated that all plant germplasm
was the common heritage of mankind.146 Like the CBD, the Seed Treaty

Stephen R. Brush & Santiago Carrizosa, Implementation Pathways, in ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY
AND SHARING THE BENEFITS: LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, IUCN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW PAPER NO. 54, at 68 (Santiago Carrizosa et al.
139

eds., 1994).
140
Id. at 69.
141
Id. at 71.
142
Id. at 72.
143
Working Group on Access and Benefits Sharing, http://www.cbd.int/abs/wgabs/ (last updated Dec.
9, 2010).
144
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising From Their Utilization art. 5(1).
145
See SMAGADI, supra note 1144, at 36.
146
Id. at 34.
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trades compensation for efforts to conserve and manage seed stocks.147
The Seed Treaty
covers all genetic material for food and agriculture by
specifically putting in place a multilateral system to
facilitate access to 64 essential crops and their varieties.
Parties deal directly with the system and not with each
other; and benefit-sharing arrangements are possible only
in the context of the genetic resources listed in the
multilateral system.148
In terms of benefits sharing, it ³calls for those parties that use material
accessed from the multilateral system and create commercial value from
WKHUHVRXUFHWRSD\DQµHTXLWDEOHVKDUH¶RIWKHEHQHILWV´149 These benefits
are administered through a common fund, via a Governing Body.150 The
Seed Treaty appears to be trying to avoid the transaction costs inherent in
the bilateral relationships envisaged by the CBD, but has not done nearly as
PXFK ZRUN DV WKH &%' RQ WKH DWWHPSW WR DUWLFXODWH ZKDW DQ µHTXLWDEOH
VKDUH¶PHDQV151

D.

Common heritage of mankind

7KH FRQFHSW RI WKH ³FRPPRQ KHULWDJH RI PDQNLQG´ ³CHM´) has
EHHQ FDOOHG ³RQH RI WKH PRVW H[WUDRUGLQDU\ GHYHORSPHQWV LQ UHFHQW
LQWHOOHFWXDO KLVWRU\´152 At its core, CHM seeks to remedy the disparities
between developed and developing nations through equitable sharing of
resources.153 The common heritage of mankind builds on the concept of
res nulliusWHUULWRU\ XQGHU QR RQH¶V FRQWURO EXW DPHQDEOH WR
appropriationand res communisa source of resources which may not
be appropriated, although the resources themselves may be.154 CMH adds
to res communis the notion of redistributionD VKDULQJ RI WKH ³SURGXFW
UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHXVHRIWKHFRPPRQ´155 Resources subject to equitable
See id. at 65.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
150
See id.
151
See infra subsection II.C.3.
152
KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 (1998).
153
Id. at 96-97.
154
EMILIO J. SAHURIE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANTARCTICA 368-369 (1992).
155
Id. at 369; see also BASLAR, supra note 152, at 43 (on benefits sharing as an addition to res
communis).
147
148
149
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sharing include material and tangible benefits, as well as knowledge and
technology.156 At the beginning, equitable sharing had only been employed
in the context of exploitation of resources;157 WKH ³KXJH ILQDQFLDO DQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOVDFULILFHV´UHTXLUHGWRSURWHFWDQGFRQVHUYH&+0KDYHDGGHG
burden-sharing to the common heritage framework.158
The concept of CHM was first espoused in a tentative fashion in
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
&HOHVWLDO%RGLHV ³2XWHU6SDFH7UHDW\´ 159 It was sent to the forefront in
the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon
DQGRWKHU&HOHVWLDO%RGLHV ³0RRQ7UHDW\´ 160 The treatment of common
resources has been articulated in the most detail, and made subject to the
most resistance, in negotiations over the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention.161
After the euphoria of the New International Economic Order
³1,(2´  IDGHG WKH GHPDQGV IRU HTXLWDEOH VKDULQJ RI FRPPRQ UHVRXUFHV
have quieted. CHM was specifically rejected in both the CBD of 1992 and
the Seed Treaty of 2004.162 Indeed, these international legal frameworks,
although arguably drawn from a shared concern with biodiversity as a
common heritage, may have responded to the resistance to the concept of
CHM. States Parties to the Antarctica Treaty System, in order to fend off a
push in the 1980s to extend the concept of CHM to Antarctica, may have
preserved their control over their treaties by acting as though Antarctica
was being held in common, albeit without admitting as much.
1.

Outer Space and Moon Treaties

The Outer Space Treaty was opened for signature less than six
years after the Soviet Union put a man into space, and less than ten years
after the launch of Sputnik. One hundred nations, including the United

BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 98.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
159
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 3, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
160
Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, GA Res. 34/68,
UN GAOR, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979).
161
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. Also, in 1982
Malaysia and other developing nations called for the concept of CHM to be applied in Antarctica. See
infra text accompanying notes 188-190.
162
See infra text accompanying notes 136 (CBD) and 146 (Seed Treaty).
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States and all other spacefaring nations, have ratified the treaty.163 The
treaty requires that the
exploration and use of outer space . . . be carried out for the
benefit and interests of all countries . . . and shall be the
SURYLQFH RI DOO PDQNLQG´ $UWLFOH , further provides that
³>R@XWHUVSDFH VKDOO EHIUHH IRU H[SORUDWLRQ DQG XVHE\ DOO
states without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law . . .
´8QGHU $UWLFOH ,, ³>R@XWHU VSDFH    LV QRW VXEMHFW WR
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
RIXVHRURFFXSDWLRQRUE\DQ\RWKHUPHDQV´7KHVHDUHWKH
so-FDOOHG ³FRPPRQ LQWHUHVW´ ³IUHHGRP´ DQG ³QRQDSSURSULDWLRQ´SULQFLSOHV164
$PRQJ WKHVHSULQFLSOHVWKH SULPDU\ JRDO ³ZDV WR SUHFOXGH DQ\ Flaims of
VRYHUHLJQW\LQRXWHUVSDFHDQGRQFHOHVWLDOERGLHV´165
As activities in space become more privately-run, commercial
endeavours, rather than nationalist demonstrations of scientific prowess,
the interpretation of the common interest and non-appropriation clauses of
the Outer Space Treaty have become more salient.166 Non-spacefaring
nations argue that any benefits from space should be equitably distributed,
ZKLOH VSDFHIDULQJ QDWLRQV FRXQWHU WKDW ³WKH SKUDVH PHUHO\ VSHDNV WR WKH
optimism inherent in space exploration and places no limitations on them
ZKDWVRHYHU´167 Along the same lines, non-spacefaring nations argue that
any mining of outer space would violate the non-appropriation principle.168
As private enterprises contemplate profit-making in space, scholars debate
whether the non-appropriation principle only prohibits national
appropriation (leaving private ownership alone),169 or whether the freedom

See U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and
Other Related General Assembly Resolutions, add. at 8-16, U.N. Doc.
ST/SPACE/11/Rev.1/Add.1/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Outer Space].
164
Captain Michael R. Hoversten, U.S. National Security And Government Regulation Of Commercial
Remote Sensing F rom Outer Space , 50 A.F. L. REV. 253, 261 (2001).
165
Adam G. Quinn, Note, The New Age Of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty And The
Weaponization Of Space , 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475, 480 (2008).
166
See e.g., Jonathan Thomas, Note, Privatization Of Space Ventures: Proposing A Proven Regulatory
Theory For Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 191 (2005) (on roadblocks
established by current treaties on privatization of outer space ventures).
167
Quinn, supra note 1655, at 480.
168
Id. at 481.
169
Zach Meyer, Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for A
Space District, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 241, 252 (2010).
163
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principle would preclude the right to exclude others through any sort of
private property rights.170
The Moon Treaty has none of the ambiguity of the Outer Space
Treaty. It has also been ratified by only thirteen nations, none of which
currently have the capability of space travel.171 The Moon Treaty
establishes that all resources outside the earth are the
³FRPPRQ KHULWDJH RI PDQNLQG´ DQG WKDW QR HQWLW\ HLWKHU
public or private can exclusively own any space resource,
DQG WKDW WKHUH PXVW EH ³HTXLWDEOH VKDULQJ´ E\ DOO VWDWH
parties in the benefits derived from space resources, taking
into consideration the needs of developing countries . . . .
Although the Moon Treaty allows parties to retain
ownership of the equipment, vehicles and installations . . .
there is no right to exclude because Article XV requires
that all vehicles, installations and equipment shall be open
to use by all other parties.172
Developing nations argued that access to Moon resources should
be approved by a majority, with each nation having one vote.173 Baslar
ZULWHVWKDW³LWZRXOGQRWEHDQH[DJJHUDWLRQWRHTXDWHWKHFRPPRQKHULWDJH
of maQNLQG ZLWK WKH ZKROH RI WKH >0RRQ 7UHDW\@ LWVHOI´174 He adds that
³WKH >0RRQ 7UHDW\@ ZDV SUHSDUHG GXULQJ WKH KHDG\ SHULRG RI WKH 1,(2
when a clear Third World majority at the United Nations was thought to be
FUHDWLQJDQµ23(&-OLNHPRQRSRO\¶RYHUWKHUHVRXUFHVRIWKHPRRQ´175
The United States responded to this attempt by calling it
³LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRFLDOLVP FRQWUROOHG E\ WKH 7KLUG :RUOG´176 Companies
WRRN RXW QHZVSDSHU DGV FDOOLQJ LW D ³7KLUG-World drive to frustrate
$PHULFD¶VKDUG-won technological supremacy.´177 The United States was
especially adverse to elements of the treaty that were hostile to U.S. private
enterprise, such as the provision that lunar facilities would be open to

David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 201, 204 (2008).
171
See Outer Space, supra note 163 (France has signed but not ratified the Moon Treaty).
172
Collins, supra note 1700, at 204-5.
173
BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 164.
174
Id. at 161.
175
Id. at 164-65. Much like the Law of the Sea Convention, developing country mineral exporters were
trying to head off a situation where minerals were supplied from the moon or other celestial bodies,
worsening their international bargaining power.
176
Id. at 161.
177
Id. at 164.
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inspection by any government that wished.178 They accurately, although
with disGDLQ FKDUDFWHUL]HG WKH WUHDW\ DV D ³7KLUG :RUOG GHPDQG IRU
massive redistribution of wealth so as ultimately to equate the economic
SRVLWLRQ RI WKH WZR KHPLVSKHUHV´179 Given the marked difference in
support for the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, and their textual
differences, it is probably a stretch to read CHM into the Outer Space
Treaty. More interesting for the purposes of understanding the distributive
function of international law is the vociferous opposition to any obligation
imposed on developed countries by the CHM framework.
2.

Antarctic Treaty System

The Antarctic treaty regime represents a powerful and somewhat
under-appreciated accomplishment of peace-making in international law,
and the sharing of resources in particular. The aspiration that Antarctica
not be a source of international discord was a very weighty goal in the late
1950s.180 Despite ambiguities in treaty documents, it enabled thirty years
of successful cooperation in scientific research, while wars were fought by
the same parties elsewhere.181 Britain and Argentina negotiated in 1982 in
good faith over Antarctica while on the brink of war in the Falklands.182
Both the United States and Russia committed to conducting no military
actions in Antarctica, which effected a complete demilitarisation of sizable
territory of military value during the Cold War.183
The Antarctic treaty regime is comprised of four treaties: (1) the
1959 Antarctic Treaty covering general prohibition of military activities
and nuclear dumping;184 (2) the 1964 Brussels Agreed Measures for the
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora;185 (3) the 1972 Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; and (4) the 1980 Convention of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.186 The Antarctic treaty regime does
Id. at 162; see also Quinn, supra note 1655, at 482- ³7KH0RRQ7UHDW\ VSULPDU\JRDOZDVWR
unambiguously deny property rights in outer space to both sovereign nations aQGSULYDWHDFWRUV´ 
179
BASLAR, supra note 1522, at 165.
180
Christopher D. Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty System : Goals, Performance, and Impact , in THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 4, 5 (Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl & Willy Østreng eds.,
1991).
181
Joe Verhoeven, General Introduction, in THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
11, 11 (Joe Verhoeven et al. eds., 1992).
182
Beeby, supra note 1800, at 4.
183
Id. at 5-6.
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Antarctic Treaty arts. 1,5, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
185
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 991.
186
Conference on the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, July, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841
(1980). A fifth treaty, the Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities, was designed to govern mineral exploitation. See Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative
Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources: Final Act and Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
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not seek to resolve the multiple overlapping claims to sovereignty over
Antarctic territory.187
Malaysia, working in the United Nations General Assembly in
1982, extended the idea of the CHM, drawn from the Law of the Sea, to
Antarctica.188 It complained that an exclusive club of twenty-five countries
was deciding the fate of Antarctica²a territory that should be organized
for the benefit of all.189 Resisting the notion of global governance, the
parties to the Antarctica Treaty System worked for decades to get
Antarctica off the United Nations agenda. Much of the criticism faded
away after the Wellington Convention was abandoned.190 Despite rejecting
in principle the concept that Antarctica should be governed in common or
that its resources should be shared among countries without regard to
technical ability or a sovereign claim, parties to the Antarctic Treaty
System appear to have effectively organized themselves almost as stewards
of a global trust. Even if conservation measures are not as effective as
could be hoped, parties have avoided²at least on land²appropriating
resources to themselves.
3.

Law of the Sea

The law of the sea has traditionally been understood as a tension
between the rights of coastal states to exploit natural resources off their
shores and the right of maritime states to freedom of navigation. But newly
decolonized countries shifted the debate from one limiting the expansion of
national jurisdiction in order to protect freedom of navigation, to one about
how the seas could be utilized ³for the economic benefit of the
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ DV D ZKROH´ by means of ³H[SORLWDWLRQ RI WKH
VXEPDULQHZHDOWKRQDQHTXDOIRRWLQJ´191 The Law of the Sea agreement
WRVKDUHWKHUHVRXUFHVRIWKHVHDEHGZDV³WUHPHQGRXVDQGXQSDUDOOHOHG´192

Mineral Resource Activities, May, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988). In the face of strong protests, the
Wellington Convention was stillborn, as it was immediately rejected by the same countries that had just
negotiated it and who now claimed a desire to radically protect the environment. See Verhoeven, supra
note 1811, at 12.
187
Beeby, supra note 1800, at 5.
188
Rajmah Hussain, The Antarctic: Common Heritage of Mankind?, in THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note E r ror! Bookmar k not defined.81, at 89.
189
Id. at 91.
190
Marie Jacobsson, The Antarctic Treaty System : Legal and Environmental Issues² Future Challenges
for the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE
FUTURE 1, 3 (Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds., 2007).
191
Christos L. Rozakis, Compromises of States Interests and Their Repercussions Upon the Rules on
the Deli mitation of the Continental Shelf, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 155, 165 (Christos L. Rozakis
& Constatine A. Stephanou eds., 1983).
192
SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 387.
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The goal was to liPLWWKH³VHOILVKH[SDQVLRQRIWKHQDWLRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQ´193
and to support the interest of the least developed states to participate in
deep-sea resources.194 The Law of the Sea was partly negotiated in reaction
WRWKHVWDWXVTXRLQ$QWDUFWLFD³FRPPRQRZQHUVhip entails the rejection of
WKH$QWDUFWLFDSDWWHUQ´ZKLFKZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDQROLJDUFK\RIILQDQFLDOO\
and technologically advanced states.195
The negotiations on how to distribute sea-bed resources were
driven by familiar land-based concerns. Mineral-exporting developing
nations were very worried about a loss of export earnings, due to a fall in
price from minerals extracted in deep sea areas instead of purchased from
them.196 In negotiating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (³UNCLOS´), such mineral-exporting nations were joined by other
developing countries in an expression of solidarity.197 Nepal and other
landlocked states proposed a Common Heritage Fund drawn from profits
on exploitations of the Exclusive Economic Zone; however, this proposal
was not adopted.198 As a result, UNCLOS arranges production by an
annual ceiling, and gives the International Sea-EHG$XWKRULW\³WKHGXW\WR
come to the aid of developing countries whose economies would be
seriously harmed by activities in the Area.´199 UNCLOS¶V $UWLFOH 
provides for payments from state to state arising from economic
exploitation in the high seas:
The coastal Slate shall make payments or contributions in
kind in respect of the exploitation of the non-living
resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.200
Rozakis, supra note 1911, at 166.
Id. at 167.
195
Rene-Jean Dupuy, The Notion of Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the Seabed, in THE NEW
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 1911, at 199, 201. Sahurie, writing in 1992, appears incredulous:
[s]mall states could not have realistically hoped for a new international economic
RUGHUE\PHUHO\UHO\LQJRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIFRPPRQ³RZQHUVKLS´RIUHVRXUFHV
they are unable to exploit by themselves; nor can they hope to share the gains in
WKRVH³FRPPRQV´XQOHVVWKH\\LHOGEHQHILWVWRWKRVHZLWKWHFKQRORJLFDODQG
financial capabilities.
But that is exactly what they hoped for. SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 371.
196
Dupuy, supra note 195, at 205.
197
Constantine A Stephanou, A European Perception of the Attitude of the United States at the F inal
Stages of UNCLO S III With Respect to the Exploitation of the Deep Sea-Bed, in THE NEW LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 191, at 259, 260.
198
DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 201 (2010).
199
Stephanou, supra note 197, at 261.
200
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 82(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (1982) (Payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles).
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The Convention specifies the amount of contribution:
The payments and contributions shall be made annually
with respect to all production at a site after the first five
years of production at that site. For the sixth year, the rate
of payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent of the value
or volume of production at the site. The rate shall increase
by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth
year and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. Production
does not include resources used in connection with
exploitation.201
The method of sharing these contributions is left to equity,
interests, and needs:
The payments or contributions shall be made through the
Authority, which shall distribute them to States Parties to
this Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria,
taking into account the interests and needs of developing
States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked
among them.202
Not only does UNCLOS provide for benefits sharing, but it creates
a multinational company called the Enterprise in order to engage in deep
seabed mining. It requires transfer to the Enterprise
on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions,
the technology that is owned by him or which he is entitled
to use by virtue of a license. In the event of his not being
authorised to grant sub-licenses, he undertakes to obtain
this right . . . . It should, furthermore, be noted here that
penalties and forfeitures are provided for, in case the
contractor refuses to carry out the above mentioned
commitments.203

Id. art. 82(2).
Id. art. 82(4).
203
Stephanou, supra note 197, at 264.
201
202
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The Nixon administration agreed to such compromises under
pressure from the Department of Defense to protect US Navy access to
international straits:
The Department of Defense assessed the price of securing
naval mobility to be concessions on the deep-seabed
interests of the Third World . . . . The deep seabed was
seen as a bargaining chip that would facilitate a quid pro
quo between the maritime powers and the Third World.204
7KHGHYHORSLQJQDWLRQVKRSHGWKDWVXFK³DVWURQJVHDEHGDXWKRULW\ZRXOG
provide a precedent for peacefully and cooperatively dealing with common
DUHDVDQGUHVRXUFHVLQWKHIXWXUH´205
This compromise was too much for the Reagan administration,
which valued coastal interests such as fishing and oil drilling above all.206
Even though all the changes requested by the Reagan administration
(having to do with technology transfer and a U.S. veto power) were
negotiated and signed by most states in 1994, the U.S. still has not signed
UNCLOS.207 Just as developing nations were rejecting the exclusive nature
of the Antarctic Treaty System, the United States thought that UNCLOS
ZDV DQ ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRFLDOLVW FDUWHO´ DQG ZRUULHG DERXW LWV SUHFHGHQW IRU
Antarctica and for outer space.208

E.

More than one governing principle
1.

Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature in December 1997,
and came into force in 2005. As of January 2009, 184 countries had
ratified the Protocol.209 It was the culmination of negotiations that began
with a World Climate Conference in 1979.210 Kyoto articulates the
SULQFLSOH RI ³FRPPRQ EXW GLIIHUHQWLDWHG UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ DQG QRWHV WKDW
³VSHFLILF QHHGV RI GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV Vhould be given full
204

STEVEN R. DAVID & PETER DIGESER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY 15
(1990).
205
See id. at 26.
206
See id. at 10-12.
207
SCOTT G. BORGERSON, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 11-12 (2009).
208
SAHURIE, supra note 1544, at 389.
209
See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, Jan. 14, 2009, http://unfccc.int/files/
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification /application/pdf/kp_ ratification.pdf.
210
See HEIKI SCHRODER, NEGOTIATING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: AN ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION
DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 14 (2001).
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FRQVLGHUDWLRQ´211 It reflected the dual governing principles of reducing
future harm and compensating developing countries for the vulnerability to
which GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶ emissions had subjected them.212 Building on
these guiding principles, the Kyoto Protocol operates by requiring certain
countries to reduce their emissions, and articulates the mechanisms of
doing so.
The manifestation of the common but differentiated responsibilities
is the requirement that the thirty-nine developed countries listed in Annex I
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least five percent below 1990
levels.213 The categories of Annex I and non-Annex I acknowledge
accountability for harmful emissions in the past rather than the ability to
reduce future world emissions. 7KH ³$QQH[ , OLVW LQFOXGHV SRRUHU
countries, the non-Annex I list LQFOXGHULFKHUFRXQWULHV´214 and the relative
contributions of each category moves closer to each other every year. The
categories reflect, therefore, a compensation motivation for distribution.
The Kyoto Protocol also includes flexibility mechanisms to
achieve emissions reductions, such as emissions trading (trading between
developed countries); joint implementation (transferring emissions
allowances between developed countries); and a Clean Development
Mechanism ³&'0´ (allowing participants to achieve part of their
obligations through projects in developing countries).215 The flexibility
mechanisms reflect a growing faith in market-based solutions for collective
action problems LQFOXGLQJ ³OLPLWHG JRYHUQPHQW DQG VWURQJ SURSHUW\
rights.´216 The CDM, in particular, was a compromise in response to a
Id. at 21.
Joyeeta Gupta, Developing Countries and the Post-Kyoto Regi me: Breaking the Tragic Lock-in of
:DLWLQJIRU(DFK2WKHU¶V6WUDWHJ\, in THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND POLICY
CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 161, 165 (W.Th. Douma et al. eds., 2007) (developing countries are
less resilient to dangers from climate change).
213
SCHRODER, supra note 210, at 64. Some countries had stronger targets. The EU has to reduce by
8%, the United States by 7 %, Japan by 6%. Id. There were other proposals that veered more strongly
from the status quo. See, e.g., MAYER HILLMAN ET AL., THE SUICIDAL PLANET: HOW TO PREVENT
GLOBAL CLIMATE CATASTROPHE 194, 194 (2007) (advocating personal carbon allowances of equal
carbon allocation for all people, with only rare exceptions).
214
Gupta, supra note 212DW*XSWDDGGVWKDWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV³prioritize, at least rhetorically,
SRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQ´DQGHPSKDVL]HWKHLUODFNRIUHVRXUFHV Id. at 165.
215
Saleemul Huq & Hannah Reid, Benefit Sharing Under the Clean Development Mechanism, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 230 (David
Freestone & Charlotte Streck, eds., 2005).
216
Kysar, supra note 46, at 2116 (arguing that market liberalism and sustainable development are
fundamentally in tension). Despite this faith in market-based solutions, the Kyoto Protocol does not
operate by means of the simplest and most robust market intervention²a carbon tax²even though
experts believe that such a tax would be the most efficient carbon mitigation scheme. See e.g., Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Cli mate Change: Why A Carbon Tax Is A
Better Response To Global Warming Than Cap And Trade , PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY WORKING PAPER
SERIES, WORKING PAPER NO. 117, March 2008 (Revised Jan. 2009) (discussing why a carbon tax is a
better solution than a cap and trade system, due to simplicity, ease of enforcement, among other
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Brazilian proposal for financial penalties for failure to meet Kyoto
REOLJDWLRQV  7KURXJK QHJRWLDWLRQ ³WKH LGHD RI D SHQDlty on governments
ZDVWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRDPHFKDQLVPIRULQYHVWPHQWE\FRPSDQLHV´217
The negotiating challenges of Kyoto are hard to overstate. In
addition to the chilling effect of the lack of U.S. participation since 1997,218
the challenges included consistent divisions between North and South
negotiating blocs and among the G-77, such as divisions between low-lying
states and oil-producing states.219 The preparation in developing countries
IRU QHJRWLDWLQJ VHVVLRQV ZDV OLPLWHG E\ ³LGHRORJLFDO YDFLOODWLRQ WKHir
relative lack of scientific information . . ., the lack of public and political
interest in climate change-related issues, and the inability to go beyond
simple, rhetorical demands . . . . This tends to lead to a hollow mandate for
negotiating purposes´220
The Kyoto Protocol iVD XQLTXHO\ DPELWLRXV SURMHFWDV LW ³DIIHFWV
choices of national economic policy and the lifestyle of citizens . . . . The
RYHUDOO HFRQRPLF LPSDFW RI WKHVH PHDVXUHV    LV HQRUPRXV´221 In an
effort to match the complexity of causation with flexible solutions, it
facilitates reductions and sequestration at the lowest cost, in a framework
imported from the American experience in acid rain permit trading.222
Earlier international environmental law frameworks imported liability
models, based on the loss of ability to exploit transboundary resources,223
or models based on principles of nuisance.224 Multilateral frameworks
employed rules to reduce harm, either by mandating technological
improvements, in the case of the move to double-hulled tankers, or by
combining this mandate with assistance to developing countries, in the case
factors). This faith in market-based solutions is in contrast to attempts not long before to address
developing country vulnerabilities through price floors and other protections. See John Ravenhill, What
is to be done for Third World commodity exporters? An evaluation of the STABEX scheme , 38 INT¶L
ORG. 537, 538 (1984) (discussing how negotiations on protecting non-oil exporting Third World
countries moved from price-setting mechanisms to a compensatory financing scheme).
217
SCHRODER, supra note 2110, at 71.
218
Gupta, supra note 2122, at 161.
219
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 135.
220
Id. at 163. Other negotiating challenges included: debates on free market promotion versus
environmental restraints on production; different treaties and bodies on climate change, some with
conflicting goals; multilateral negotiations and unilateral negotiations initiated by the United States,
FUHDWLQJFRQIXVLRQQHJRWLDWLRQVKHOGLQ³PXOWLSOHQRQ-SOHQDU\VHVVLRQV´DQGSRRUO\RUJDQL]HG
coalitions within the developing world. Id.
221
Michael Bothe, The Kyoto Protocol as a Pioneer Among the Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, in THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 241, 242 (W.Th. Douma et al. eds., 2007).
222
Id. at 244.
223
Thomas A. Reynolds, Deli mitation, Exploitation, And Allocation Of Transboundary Oil & Gas
Deposits Between Nation-States, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 164 (1995).
224
See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-81 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941) (on
cross-border pollution arising in a Canadian smelter).
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of the Montreal Protocol on CFCs.225 The Kyoto Protocol reflects both the
principle of compensation for past wrongs, as well as a finely granulated
model to invest in global climate protection.
I I I.

Patterns of Distribution in International L aw

Despite the charge that distribution between nations is not a
strength of international law, global frameworks distribute resources in
powerful, albeit unnoticed, ways. The success of this distribution depends
not on the topic at hand, but on the motivating principle behind the
distributive framework.
Distribution based on the principles of
compensation for past harm or investment in public goods is time-tested
and uncontroversial. Distribution based on necessity is a newer entrant to
the field, but succeeds due to moral force. Despite decades of pressure and
a variety of attempts, the common heritage of mankind has been rejected as
an organizing principle of distribution in international law, although states
appear to respect it in practice, at least for low-value resources.
As the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal demonstrates, the norm of
compensation for harm to private property is sufficiently well established
to undergird distribution of resources even between the most ardent
enemies. The measure of liability is hotly contested, as is the relative
ability of a country to change protections for private property within its
borders. Even as the measure of damages or attribution of liability
changes, nations feel confident asking for and expecting compensation for
harm to private property.
Less well known than compensation, and yet more powerfully
integrated into the globalized economy, are distribution frameworks that
invest in global public goods. Whether keeping the mail moving or
stopping the flow of small arms, international law effectively distributes
resources in order to achieve a specific, shared goal. In these frameworks
there is a clear need on the part of developed countries, and little discussion
of the question of liability. The debate is purely one of how to achieve a
simple goal rather than one of corrective justice, and classifications based
on considerations of anything other than effectiveness muddy the clarity of
the investment motivation.
Distribution based on necessity is a new facet of the distributional
function of international law. Distinct from charity, such as the outpouring
of support that might follow a natural disaster, international law distributes
225

The Montreal Protocol on CFCs included a Multilateral Fund for ozone depletion which
³FRPSHQVDWHVGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVIRUWKHµDJUHHGLQFUHPHQWDOFRVWV¶RISURMHFWVWKDWUHSODFHR]RQHdepleting substances . . . To date, about $1 billion has been committed to projects to cut ozone-depleting
VXEVWDQFHV´VICTOR, supra note 11, at 37.
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the outcome of requests (or demands) for commitments to remedy an unfair
status quo. The campaign for sovereign debt relief demonstrates that the
ability to alleviate suffering motivates distribution, as long as a precise and
powerful campaign can engage domestic constituencies. A similar
campaign for access to essential medicines has had a modest impact to
date, as the principle of necessity resulted in the redistribution of
intellectual property rights and revenue to developing countries through an
international legal framework.226
The concept of common ownership, or the common heritage of
mankind, emerged in the Cold War era when developing countries were
flexing new-found power. They sought to corral previously unclaimed
resources in space, the moon, the high seas, and Antarctica. This effort has
been roundly rejected by the nations that are currently able to exploit
opportunities in these new frontiers. The Outer Space Treaty, signed by
over a hundred countries, aims to preclude claims of sovereignty and
requires that activities in outer space be organized for the common benefit
and interest of all. The Moon Treaty, ratified by thirteen non-spacefaring
nations, calls for the equitable sharing of resources based on the common
heritage of mankind. Although the parties to the Antarctic Treaty System
worked for years to fend off pressure to organize the Antarctic under
common ownership, when pressed, they shelved a framework that would
have allowed for mining in the Antarctic. The ardent exposition of the
common heritage of mankind finally drew the United States out of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, the United States, along with
the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy, provided for
some percentage of deep sea mining revenues to be shared with developing
nations.227 This forbearance may be tested as resources in new frontiers
become more valuable.228
International law distributes resources for compensation as an
investment in public goods and due to necessity, while it founders with
frameworks that draw on the common heritage of mankind or on more than
one norm. Arguably, the Kyoto Protocol could have been justified as
compensation for past harm, given the incontrovertible responsibility of
developed nations for cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. It could also
have been explained as an investment in a global public good, given the
See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J.    GHVFULELQJWKHµDFFHVV WRNQRZOHGJH¶FKDOOHQJHWRWKH
traditional intellectual property system).
227
See BASLAR, supra note 1522DW7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶IXQGZDVHQDFWHGLQDQGLVFRGLIied at
30 U.S.C. § 1472 (2006).
228
The common heritage of the seas was never tested, as deep sea mining never became profitable. In
comparison, revenue from fishing on the high seas has never been shared through some sort of equitable
mechanism.
226
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shared reliance on the ecological status quo. However, Kyoto combined
differential responsibilities based on past contribution with a variety of
efficiency mechanisms based on a shared investment framework.
,QFRQVLVWHQFLHV EHWZHHQ D FRXQWU\¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ XQGHU WKH SULQFLSOH RI
liability and its ability to invest in a shared goal²in the case of China²or
between its responsibility and its vulnerability to the chaos caused by such
greenhouse gases²in the case of the United States²drove a wedge
through the Kyoto Protocol.229
Conclusion
The breadth of areas for which international law redistributes
resources should put to rest the qXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU ³[w]e should rarely
observe treaties that redistribute wealth from one state to another´230
Indeed, we frequently observe treaties of this nature. By offering a
description of the state of distribution in international law, this Article has
attempted to counter the presumption that such distribution does not
happen. In addition, this Article posits an explanation of why distribution
occurs without contest in some areas, and only in the face of great
opposition in others. It aims to help international law practitioners
understand the implications of the way that distributive frameworks are
designed on the likely success of the treaty, particularly in terms of
motivating principles.
One lesson of this survey of distribution in international law is that
models of distribution oriented towards one goal are judged by what they
mean for distribution in general. Developing countries hoped that the
Moon Treaty would be a template for a massive distribution of wealth, and
the United States worried about what the Law of the Sea meant as
precedent for Antarctica, outer space, and the moon. In reacting so
strongly against distribution based on the common heritage of mankind, the
United States operated under the assumption that distribution under
international law was possible and the United States needed to be protected
from what it VDZDVµLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLDOLVP¶
Another lesson from this survey is that distributive frameworks
learn from each other. The Antarctic Treaty System responded with
apprehension to the movement towards a common heritage of mankind
expressed in the Law of the Sea. The Moon Treaty tried to overcome the
lack of recognition of the common heritage of mankind in both the Outer
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1567-68 (analyzing climate change through a lens of
corrective and distributional justice).
230
Posner, supra note 9.
229
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Space treaty and the Antarctica Treaties. The CBD and the Seed Treaty
rejected the notion of common heritage, focusing instead on common
opportunity, and the Seed Treaty avoided the bilateral arrangements of the
CBD. Far from being a rare occurrence, distribution under international
law is indispensible to the practical and moral fabric of a globalized world.
As long as the call for distribution justifies itself by one principle of
compensation, investment, or necessity, it can be expected to do the work
of international law in maintaining the world public order.
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